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Abstract 
 Data management in resource-limited settings can be a mountainous problem if not 
approached with a thorough understanding of those limitations and a mindset prepared for rapid 
changes in the environment. Data management becomes even more challenging at multiple 
points of entry, where there are many interwoven parts working together in order to get a 
potential traveler from his/her first steps into an airport area to boarding a plane, all while 
ensuring that the traveler has been thoroughly screened for any signs or symptoms of a possible 
Ebola virus disease infection. This capstone describes the history of the International Health 
Regulations’ effects on control of disease spread and importation at points of entry, the Do Not 
Board/Lookout List’s role in disease control in the United States, and the CDC’s International 
Assistance Team’s unique task in creating and implementing country-specific databases to meet 
the needs of Ebola-affected countries. The most critical data management need at these 
countries’ points of entry is specifically to prevent the exportation of Ebola virus disease in order 
to keep each country’s airspace open and allow goods, personnel and services to continue to be 
imported into these countries during this sustained Ebola outbreak.  
KEYWORDS: Data management, resource-limited, Ebola, travel restrictions, Epi Info  
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Legend of Acronyms 
CDC – Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CFR – Case-fatality rate 
DHS – United States Department of Homeland Security 
DNB/LO – Do Not Board/Lookout List 
EBOV – Ebola virus (also known as Ebola virus disease) 
EHF – Ebola hemorrhagic fever (now known as Ebola virus, or Ebola virus disease) 
EVD – Ebola virus disease (also known as Ebola virus; previously known as Ebola hemorrhagic 
fever) 
H1N1 – Influenza A virus subtype H1N1 (also known as “swine flu”) 
HIS – Health information system 
HHS – U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
IHRs – International Health Regulations (previously known as International Sanitary 
Regulations) 
ISRs – International Sanitary Regulations (now known as International Health Regulations) 
MoH – Ministry of Health 
MDR/XDR-TB – Multi-drug resistant/Extensively-drug resistant tuberculosis 
MSF – Médecins Sans Frontières (also known as Doctors without Borders) 
NHP – Non-human primate 
PHEIC – Public Health Emergency of International Concern 
SQL – Structured Query Language 
WHA – World Health Assembly 
WHO – World Health Organization 
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Chapter 1 (Introduction) 
Ebola: History, Taxonomy, Transmission and Symptoms 
Ebola virus disease (EVD), previously known as Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF), is a 
severe disease that can be contracted by humans and non-human primates (NHPs); it appears 
seemingly sporadically and is often fatal in its infected host. It is caused by infection with one of 
the special viruses under the genus Ebolavirus, in the family Filoviridae (Kuhn et al., 2010; 
“Ebola”, 2014). The virus is named after the river where it was first discovered in 1976 in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly known as Zaire). Since then, it has been responsible 
for 30 known outbreaks in humans, ranging from 1 to over 14,000 infected. As of December 3, 
2014, the current Ebola outbreak is responsible for about 88% of all cases since 1976, and for 
79% of all deaths (World Health Organization, December 2014).  
 There are five different species, also known as subtypes or strains, of EVD: Bundibugyo 
ebolavirus, Taï Forest ebolavirus (formerly known as Côte d’Ivoire ebolavirus), Sudan 
ebolavirus, Zaire ebolavirus, and Reston ebolavirus (“Ebola”, 2014). Reston ebolavirus has 
never been proven to cause disease in humans (only in NHPs), whereas all four other subtypes 
have. Zaire ebolavirus in particular has been associated with over half of all EVD outbreaks in 
the past four decades. Because the Zaire ebolavirus strain has caused the majority of cases and 
deaths in humans since its discovery, it is now commonly referred to in shorthand as Ebola virus, 
or EBOV. From this point on, the Zaire ebolavirus will be the subtype referenced to whenever 
the word Ebola is mentioned. 
 Ebola is confirmed to be transmitted through two main routes: firstly, through direct 
contact with a symptomatic, infected individual’s blood or other bodily fluids (including mucus, 
vomitus, semen, feces, saliva, and urine); and secondly, through direct contact with objects that 
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have been recently tainted with these blood or bodily fluids of a human or non-human primate 
(“Ebola”, 2014). In addition, it is thought to be introduced into a human or non-human primate 
population by direct contact with the blood or other bodily fluids of an animal host (thought to be 
fruit bats or duikers); this route has not been confirmed but has been purported as the most likely 
transmission mechanism at this time (Olival & Hayman, 2014). The main symptoms of Ebola 
include fever, headache, vomiting, diarrhea, muscle pain, stomach pain, and inexplicable 
bleeding or bruising (“Ebola”, 2014). 
Ebola Outbreak of 2014: Past, Present and Future 
The current Ebola outbreak in West Africa was first reported by the Guinea Ministry of 
Health on March 21, 2014 (Dixon & Schaefer, 2014). The report stated that there were 49 cases, 
including 29 deaths, in four Guinean districts bordering Liberia and Sierra Leone; seven blood 
samples were sent to Institut Pasteur in France, where polymerase chain reaction testing found 
Ebolavirus in six of the samples (“Ebola virus disease in Guinea”, 2014). Since this initial report, 
the virus has spread to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Senegal, Spain, the United States, and 
Mali. Senegal and Nigeria have since been declared Ebola-free (on October 17 and 20, 
respectively), whereas Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone are still attempting to stem transmission 
of the disease (“Nigeria is now free”, 2014; “The outbreak of Ebola”, 2014). The United States, 
Spain, and Mali are still within the two incubation periods of their last Ebola case. As of 
November 12, 2014, there are 14,098 cases, with 5,160 deaths – this includes 1,878 cases with 
1,142 deaths in Guinea; 6,822 cases with 2,836 deaths in Liberia; and 5,368 cases with 1,169 
deaths in Sierra Leone (World Health Organization, November 2014). 
The World Health Organization, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the U.S. military, the Cuban Ministry of Health, the 
International Red Cross, and countless other agencies have deployed individuals to these 
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countries to assist in efforts to combat the outbreak (Dixon & Schafer, 2014; Kelland & Miles, 
2014; McKay, 2014). This outbreak is the largest Ebola epidemic in history. On September 26, 
the CDC reported that if sufficient changes have not been made in community behavior and 
additional interventions have not been made, that the count of Ebola cases may reach 1.4 million 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone by January 20, 2015 (Meltzer et al.). Never before has there been 
such a need for mass education and large-scale public health interventions. 
Chapter 2 (Review of Literature) 
International Health Regulations & Public Health Emergencies of International Concern 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), “the International Health 
Regulations (IHRs) are an international legal instrument that is binding on 196 countries across 
the globe, including all the Member States of WHO. Their aim is to help the international 
community prevent and respond to acute public health risks that have the potential to cross 
borders and threaten people worldwide” (“International Health Regulations", n.d.).  
In 1951, the first set of these regulations appeared under the name of International 
Sanitary Regulations (ISRs). They were adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA), the 
WHO’s decision-making body, that met in 1951. The ISRs focused largely on sanitary measures 
and procedures during travel, and on six diseases that were quarantinable at the time: plague, 
cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, typhus, and “relapsing fever” (World Health Organization, 
1951; Hardiman, 2012). At that time, relapsing fever covered a variety of otherwise unspecified 
diseases that manifested with fever as an underlying symptom. 
On July 25, 1969, a new set of regulations entitled the International Health Regulations 
(IHRs) were adopted by the World Health Assembly; its purpose was “to ensure the maximum 
security against the international spread of diseases with a minimum interference with world 
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traffic” (World Health Organization, 1995). The regulations were later amended by WHAs in 
both 1973 and 1981. These IHR amendments established only three diseases as quarantinable: 
plague, cholera, and yellow fever (World Health Organization, 1995). 
In 2005, the World Health Organization proposed a radically revised set of International 
Health Regulations. One of the biggest differences is that these IHRs are not limited to any 
certain diseases, which means that they can be relevant and applicable for a longer period of 
time, especially in the wake of new infectious diseases that have been discovered at higher rates 
than ever before in mankind’s recorded history (International Health Regulations, 2005; 
Merianos & Peiris, 2005).  
One of the 2005 International Health Regulations’ innovations is a set of “procedures for 
the determination by the Director-General of a ‘public health emergency of international 
concern’ and issuance of corresponding temporary recommendations, after taking into account 
the views of an Emergency Committee” (International Health Regulations, 2005). In the 
International Health Regulations, a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) is 
defined as an “extraordinary event” that constitutes a public health risk to other countries and 
potentially requires an internationally coordinated response.  
Since the establishment of PHEIC reporting, there have been three issuances: firstly, in 
April 2009 as a response to the H1N1 (swine flu) pandemic; secondly, in May 2014 as the 
incidence of polio cases began to rise in spite of public health eradication efforts; and most 
recently, on August 8, 2014, in response to the current Ebola outbreak in West Africa (“Swine 
flu illness”, 2009; MacKenzie, 2014; “WHO statement”, 2014). Whenever a PHEIC is issued, 
the WHO may offer international risk severity assessments and collaboration of international 
assistance mobilization, which has proven particularly crucial in the current response as multiple 
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countries and partners ally against the Ebola epidemic (International Health Regulations, 2005; 
Green, 2014). 
Do Not Board/Lookout List 
In January 2007, the WHO published recommendations on involuntary treatment of 
individuals with extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB), saying that “if a patient 
willfully refuses treatment and, as a result, is a danger to the public, the serious threat posed by 
XDR-TB means that limiting that individual’s human rights may be necessary to protect the 
wider public” (“WHO guidance on human rights”, 2007). In the same month, a patient in 
Georgia underwent screening for tuberculosis, and was found to have a multidrug-resistant 
(MDR) strain in May 2007. After being warned not to travel on any commercial conveyances 
until he was no longer infectious, the patient proceeded to advance his departure date and 
traveled on May 12, regardless of this action (Fidler, Gostin, & Markel, 2007).  
CDC tracked the patient down in Rome on May 23 and requested that he abstain from 
travelling on commercial air conveyances since he posed a threat to the public. The following 
day, as CDC began exploring options for a treatment regimen and for bringing the patient back 
without exposing others, the patient traveled again, to Prague and Montreal. On this same day 
(May 24), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) sent word to the WHO that 
this situation may qualify to be classified as a PHEIC. The patient re-entered the United States 
by automobile from Canada and was located and ordered to go to a hospital in New York City 
for federal isolation.  
Shortly after this incident, in June 2007, HHS and the CDC established a “Do Not Board” 
list in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This gives power to 
international and domestic public health agencies to request boarding restrictions for individuals 
with certain communicable diseases who pose a threat to the public (Penfield et al., 2008). In 
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essence, it is a modified version of the already existing “No Fly” list, adapted to suit public 
health needs. When first established, CDC’s three requirements for an individual to be placed on 
the “Do Not Board” list were as follows: 
(1) the individual has an a communicable disease that would constitute a public health 
threat if he or she were allowed to travel by airplane; (2) the individual is unaware of, or 
will become nonadherent to, public health recommendations regarding treatment or other 
instructions; and (3) the individual intends to travel by airplane. (Bascetta & Larence, 
2008) 
After an individual has been determined to no longer pose a public health threat, namely 
due to reaching a state of non-infectiousness, that patient is removed from the Do Not Board list. 
From June 2007 to December 2011, over 200 individuals were added to the Do Not Board list 
due to meeting the above-listed criteria; and as of mid-2012, almost 90% of those individuals had 
been removed (Kim et al., 2012). 
Data Management in Limited Resource Environments: An Overview 
Data management is an often undervalued necessity during infectious disease outbreaks. 
Much importance is placed on study design, data collection, and analysis, but the data 
management component – the foundation of the data itself – is often misunderstood and 
overlooked. This rings especially true in international and large collaborative studies, where data 
can often come from varying sources at aberrant times, greatly increasing the chances for 
misinterpretation (Ali et al., 2006; Pandav et al., 2002).  
According to multiple international agencies, there is a growing recognition that 
improved health information systems (HISs) are needed in order to address issues of health 
service delivery, including immunization coverage, outbreak predictions, and budgetary need for 
public health interventions (Braa, Monteiro & Sahay, 2004). 
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Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone have each had significant challenges in terms of data 
management. They have no vital statistics records from 2005 to 2012, meaning that they cannot 
accurately report their leading causes of death, though other methods have been used in attempts 
to try to bridge that gap (Masquelier et al., 2014; Phillips et al., 2014). In addition, Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone each have been found to be separated from other African countries by a 
large disparity of operational research being conducted there (Smith, 2008). When surveyed on 
the state of their national health research systems by the World Health Organization, none of the 
three countries responded (Kirigia & Wambebe, 2006). In addition, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone’s Internet penetration rates are among the lowest in Africa, at .5%, .03%, and .2%, 
respectively (Nwagwu & Ibitola, 2010). 
Data Management of Health Systems in Guinea 
After repeated outbreaks of cholera in Guinea from 2004-2008, which were responsible 
for 17,638 cases and 786 deaths, Guinea created a surveillance system solely responsible for 
providing early alerts to the Ministry of Health in order to quickly detect any new outbreaks; this 
system relies on indicators such as cholera microbiological surveillance (Rebaudet et al., 2014). 
After a country-wide cholera epidemic in 2012, genotype mapping, whole-genome sequencing, 
and genome-wide phylogeny analysis were used to suggest that it was started by an imported 
case from Sierra Leone. These results were used to stress the importance of robust surveillance 
systems to track cross-border identifiers and survey mobile and vulnerable populations in order 
to better identify and prevent future epidemics at their source (Rebaudet et al., 2014). 
According to a study conducted by the Institute of Tropical Medicine in Belgium, well-
functioning health services are instrumental in preventing deaths due to epidemics in Guinea; the 
researchers from this study greatly stressed the importance of case management in epidemics of 
diseases such as (but not limited to) cholera, meningococcal meningitis and measles (Damme & 
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Lerberghe, 2004). However, their results were riddled with limitations due to a lack of 
centralized data management – in particular, they used different primary and secondary sources 
for cost estimates and imprecise estimates of case fatality rates (CFRs) and attack rates of disease 
(Damme & Lerberghe, 2004).  
Unfortunately, Guinea has had instability in its healthcare funding, despite the above-
mentioned arguments for better health services and more robust case management. In particular, 
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007 to 2008, a descriptive study was conducted 
by the World Health Organization in 2011 that indicated that Guinea was unsure whether they 
would see government funding for their health programs increase, decrease, or stay the same in 
the next fiscal year (Kirigia, Nganda, Mwikisa, & Cardoso, 2011). 
Data Management of Health Systems in Liberia 
From 1980 to 2003, Liberia was entrenched in local conflicts that led to years of civil war 
(Bøås & Utas, 2014). Some of the major setbacks caused by these wars were an interruption of 
education due to devastating damage to university laboratories and classrooms, a lack of reliable 
electricity and water, and shortages of university staff (Challoner & Forget, 2011). Other 
setbacks that impact data management operations in Liberia include poor roads, geographic 
distances, and poor communication infrastructure (Lori, Munro, Boyd & Andreatta, 2012). 
In 2003, Liberia began rebuilding their health care sector, and alongside it, they began 
strengthening their data management capacities. Assessments done on different health care data 
management systems suggest that increased additional measures to strengthen data management 
at all levels of their health systems are still needed (Lee et al., 2011). 
Data Management of Health Systems in Sierra Leone 
In Sierra Leone, a country that had just recently exited a civil war that waged from 1991 
to 2002, there has been very little infrastructure for robust data management and public health 
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surveillance (Kebede et al., 2013; Mitton, 2012). In prior data management system 
implementations, challenges included rapid staff turnover, interruptions in electrical power 
supplies, the departure of humanitarian assistance groups after the war’s end, the rebuilding of 
health and education facilities, disruption of training in healthcare workers, fragmented 
information systems, inconsistent data definitions, and overall poor data quality (Sæbø, Kossi, 
Titlestad, Tohouri, & Braa, 2011; Kebede et al., 2013; Shaffer et al., 2014). Additional technical 
ineffective gaps in Sierra Leone’s primary and peripheral health units have recently been 
identified. Namely, more than half of Sierra Leone’s peripheral health units, maternal and child 
health posts, community health centers, and community health posts are operating at sub-optimal 
levels of technical efficiency (Renner at al., 2005; Kirigia et al., 2011). 
According to multiple studies, many of these issues have improved after conducting 
intensive training, involving community health staff and other stakeholders in discussions on 
how to improve current systems, holding regular meetings to review data harmonization 
progress, securing stable funding for data management programs, establishment of timelines 
specific to data-oriented goals, and recruitment of community volunteers to conduct interviews 
for baseline studies (Koroma et al., 2011; Sæbø, Kossi, Titlestad, Tohouri, & Braa, 2011; 
Kebede et al., 2013). 
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Chapter 3 (Methodology) 
Before data can be reported out to external partners, news outlets, and the general public 
as a whole, a data management system has to be established from the bottom up. In order to 
develop a robust data management system that can be used internationally, the following 
questions must be addressed: 
• What is the process that is being captured in a data management system, from beginning 
to end? 
• What is each country’s existing data management approach, specifically for purposes of 
public health surveillance? 
• What data can we anticipate being collected? 
• Is the system meant to be used for active or passive surveillance? 
• What data system(s) should be used for management of the data collected? 
• What capacity exists for data entry, quality assurance, etc. – is the system that will be set 
up going to be sustainable after its initiation? 
• What will the country in question do with the data that is entered – will it be used to 
make policy decisions? Budgetary resolutions? Track individuals? 
• Who will/should have access to the data entered? 
To answer the first question, “what is the process being captured”, the exit screening 
process must be described in some detail. Exit screening of passengers leaving countries with 
widespread Ebola transmission started around August of 2014, with collaboration between the 
WHO, the CDC, and local airports, airlines, and healthcare workers. Across each of the three 
countries, exit screening was initiated as a measure to prevent potentially infected individuals – 
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and contacts of those individuals – from flying out of the country and spreading Ebola to other 
countries.  
Exit Screening: The Process 
Exit screening consists of three levels: primary screening, secondary screening, and 
referral for medical evaluation and public health notification. Every traveler who plans to board a 
flight leaving a country with widespread Ebola transmission must undergo primary screening. 
During this step, each traveler is screened for preliminary signs, symptoms, or risks of exposure 
to Ebola (Centers for Disease Control, 2014). This is done by a trained airport worker who 
administers a primary screening form that asks questions about the signs, symptoms, and 
exposures being assessed. In addition, the airport worker uses a non-contact thermometer to take 
each passenger’s temperature, and records it on the primary screening form. If the passenger 
being screened answers “Yes” to any of the questions about signs, symptoms, or exposures, or if 
a passenger’s temperature is greater than or equal to 38○C/100.4○F, then that traveler is then 
taken to secondary screening. The primary screening form that is administered to each passenger 
looks like the template that the CDC provided to each country (see Figure 1). 
If a passenger is taken to secondary screening, (s)he is evaluated further by an individual 
with public health and/or medical training. An in-depth public health interview is administered in 
order to better understand any signs, symptoms and/or risks of exposure that the passenger has 
reported, and a second temperature measurement is taken. At this point, the passenger is either 
restricted from traveling, referred for medical evaluation and/or treatment, or released to travel. 
More specifically, if a passenger is determined to be at risk of developing Ebola, but is 
asymptomatic during screening, that traveler should be denied boarding until the end of the 21 
day incubation period (which started on the last date of the traveler’s self-reported exposure). 
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The secondary screening form that is administered to passengers undergoing this level of 
screening looks like the template provided by CDC as well (see Figures 2-4). 
 
Figure 1 – Primary Screening Form template (from CDC’s guidance on Pre-Departure/Exit Screening). 
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Figure 2 – Secondary screening form template, page 1 (from CDC’s guidance on Pre-Departure/Exit Screening).  
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Figure 3 – Secondary screening form template, page 2 (from CDC’s guidance on Pre-Departure/Exit Screening). 
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Figure 4 – Secondary screening form template, page 3 (from CDC’s guidance on Pre-Departure/Exit Screening). 
Exit Screening: Database Creation 
In order to accurately capture the data obtained during exit screening, the CDC’s Global 
Migration Task Force created a Data Management Unit to develop low-technology data 
management solutions for countries with widespread Ebola transmission implementing exit 
screening. The Data Management Unit created an Epi Info database that was identical to the 
primary and secondary screening forms. Epi Info is a free software tool first developed by the 
CDC over 20 years ago; the most recent version, 7.1.4, was released on July 11, 2014. It has 
been an open source program since its source code was first published to Codeplex, an open 
source project hosting website, in 2008. Since Epi Info was first created, it has been downloaded 
in over 180 countries and has been used in countless epidemiologic investigations. 
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While creating the Epi Info database to capture information from the exit screening 
process, the Data Management Unit closely followed an already existing database designed by 
the CDC’s Ebola Epidemiology & Surveillance team for community-level contact investigations 
(CIs), in hopes that a link would later be found between the two databases. The link would then 
be able to provide a method of communication between the CI database and the exit screening 
database in order to query whether an outbound passenger going through exit screening had 
already been identified as a contact of an Ebola case in a contact investigation. In order to 
maintain close uniformity with this CI database, the Data Management Unit modeled most of its 
variable names to match the CI variables in existence, so that if a link was found, the variables 
could merge seamlessly.  
 
Figure 5 – A snapshot of a data enterer’s view of the exit screening database created in Epi Info. 
 
For example, if the Surname in Figure 5 (listed above) had a variable name of Surname, 
but the CI database had a variable name of Lastname for the same field, those variables would 
not be seamlessly merged when comparing the data from the two databases. Much time was 
spent ensuring that each variable matched as closely as possible to allow for this capability. 
In addition to developing a fully functional Epi Info database, the Data Management Unit 
created a data dictionary with descriptions of each variable, and a Data Entry guide that could be 
easily tailored to each country’s exit screening database. This way, if there was quick turnaround 
in the data entry staff in each country, the new data enterer(s) could quickly learn the rules for 
data entry into the database without requiring much intensive training. 
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Exit Screening: Database Deployment 
After creating the database to be used in each country, the Data Management Unit 
encountered a unique obstacle: How does one successfully deploy a database in a country that 
has intermittent Internet access (at best) at each point of entry? One of the most important 
structures that a database requires to work effectively is the ability to share information in real-
time on different computers. This is important because of the three following reasons: 
• If data entry is required on more than one computer at the same time, that data needs to 
still be entered into the same centralized database; if data is entered separately and later 
merged, the chances of duplication are greatly increased. 
• If data entry is happening on one side of the airport, the individuals conducting exit 
screening need to be able to see that entered data in real time in order to successfully 
ensure that no passengers with possible signs, symptoms or exposures are able to board a 
plane (ex. – if a passenger attempts boarding a plane on Monday and is denied boarding 
due to self-reporting a risk, and then that passenger attempts boarding again on 
Wednesday, (s)he will show up in the system as flagged due to a previously reported 
exposure fewer than 21 days ago). 
• If changes need to be made to the original database (ex. – a new question is added to the 
secondary screening form and the database now needs to be able to capture it), that same 
database needs to be updated in real-time for any computers being used to enter data. 
In order to tackle this issue, the Data Management Unit set to work on finding a solution. 
Quickly, the Unit was able to identify one: they would send two rugged laptops and one high 
performance laptop with a partitioned hard drive, giving it the capability to act as a SQL server, 
along with a switch and cables that would effectively set up a local area network to ensure the 
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capability to have multiple data enterers enter data into the same system in each country 
conducting exit screening in real time (see Figures 6-7). The Unit deployed two teams to Liberia 
and to Sierra Leone in order to first implement the Epi Info version of the database. 
 
Figure 6 – The switch and cables (one cable per laptop) used to set up a Local Area Network (LAN). 
 
Figure 7 – One of the rugged laptops. Two rugged laptops and one high performance laptop were deployed per country. 
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Chapter 4 (Results) 
Data Management in Liberia 
 On August 14, 2014, the Data Management Unit deployed two individuals to Liberia in 
order to initiate the first local area network-enabled database to be used to capture exit screening 
data for individuals leaving the country through its airport in the capital, Monrovia – Roberts 
International Airport. Once they were on the ground in Liberia, the team quickly encountered 
several setbacks. The three biggest problems were: 1) a lack of manpower to enter data for every 
traveler who was screened, 2) a lack of diversity in the data, and 3) no foreseeable way to link 
the exit screening database with Liberia’s community-level CI database. 
 Firstly, the lack of manpower was due to an already taxing amount of work being placed 
on the screeners at the Roberts International Airport in Monrovia, Liberia. With the current 
outbreak draining time and resources from all parts of Liberia’s workforce, the screening staff 
were already overworked and did not have individuals to spare to perform data entry on each 
form. In order to address this issue, the team came to an agreement that data would only be 
entered on individuals who were referred for secondary screening – that is, the public health 
interview. Individuals who only went through primary screening would not be entered into the 
database, but their forms would still be counted to show the number of travelers being exit 
screened, and then they would be stored in a secure manner (e.g. – locked filing cabinets) in case 
one needed to be accessed later. 
 Secondly, the lack of diversity in the data was closely tied to the first problem – very few 
individuals were actually referred for secondary screening because most said “No” to each of the 
symptom and exposure questions. If an individual had an Ebola-related exposure, but was not 
running a fever when (s)he was exit screened, then (s)he could decline to self-report the exposure 
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and successfully make it through exit screening unnoticed. This is what happened in the case of 
the first imported case of Ebola to the United States, which is discussed further in the conclusion. 
 Lastly, it was discovered that there was no existing link that would allow for accurate and 
effective data integration between the exit screening database and the community-level contact 
investigation database. The reason for this was that the information being collected at the 
community level was very different in terms of identifiers. For example, passport numbers make 
sense to be collected in an airport setting, but in a community setting where most don’t even 
have a government-issued ID, it’s not a realistic variable to record. The unique identifier for the 
community-level CI database was generated from each contact’s relationship with a probable or 
confirmed case. Other than that, there were no unique identifiers available to link the two 
databases together. Please see Table 1 for further details on identifier comparisons between the 
two databases. 
Data Management in Sierra Leone 
Due to the setbacks identified in Liberia, it was decided that the Data Management Unit 
would not send out additional data managers into the field at this time. However, the Unit would 
still provide databases, guides and recommendations for data management to the CDC staff who 
were already deployed in country and working on other aspects of exit screening (such as 
training screening staff on how to don and doff personal protective equipment, how to take 
temperatures with non-contact thermometers, meeting with airport staff and community 
stakeholders to emphasize the importance of exit screening, etc.). In mid-August, the CDC team 
deployed to Sierra Leone requested a database fashioned to match the amended primary and 
secondary screening forms they were using for in-country exit screening at the Lungi 
International Airport. The Data Management Unit got to work on this request and provided a 
database package in less than a week. 
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After sending the database package, the Unit provided a walkthrough training on the 
database to a local employee who was working with the CDC staff in order to enter data into the 
database. It was decided that only individuals who were sent for secondary screening would have 
records entered into the database (like Liberia had already decided), eliminating much of the 
need for increased data entry staffing. Since the initial send-out of the database, there were 
several revisions to Sierra Leone’s exit screening forms, which the Unit has been able to 
incorporate into new versions of the database. 
Data Management in Guinea 
 At the end of August, the Data Management Unit attempted getting a database and team 
out to Guinea, but were set back by competing priorities. By mid-September, it was verified that 
Guinea did not want a database to capture exit screening processes at this point in time. At the 
Conakry International Airport in Guinea, the contracted airport authority SOGEAC (Societe de 
Geston et D’Exploitation de L’Aeroport de Conakry) and local leadership were already content 
with the current screening process. Due to the structure of the airport, everyone that would fly 
out internationally was screened 3 times before they boarded a plane (twice in primary screening 
and a third time at the boarding gate).  
According to CDC staff in country, the forms were exchanged for boarding passes or 
entry into the security screening area, and then collected by the contract airport authority 
(SOGEAC).  Passengers that are denied boarding were processed differently, and their records 
kept in a log book. In an airport authority business meeting, it was determined that SOGEAC 
would maintain the original copies and a copy would be logged into the log book.  Data would 
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Chapter 5 (Conclusion and Discussion) 
The first imported Ebola case in the United States – Going Forward 
 On September 30, 2014, the first imported case of Ebola was diagnosed at Texas Health 
Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas. It was quickly discovered that this individual had flown to the 
United States from Liberia, and during exit screening, did not display any symptoms or report 
any exposures, though he had been exposed to an individual who was displaying symptoms of 
Ebola shortly before he departed the country (Onishi & Santora, 2014). After this case was 
diagnosed, the Liberian government decided to add a line to its exit screening form stating that 
each individual who filled this form out must answer it truthfully or else be subject to 
prosecution.  
 On October 11, fewer than two weeks after this case of Ebola was imported, the CDC 
initiated entry screening procedures at the John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York as 
an additional security measure. By October 16, the Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR), 
Dulles International Airport (IAD), Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport (ATL) and Chicago-
O’Hare International Airport (ORD) began entry screening as well. This added measure ensures 
that any traveler who is coming from one of the countries with widespread Ebola transmission is 
actively monitored by the appropriate state health department for any signs or symptoms of 
Ebola for 21 days after departing the country. 
 On October 23, an additional case of Ebola was diagnosed in a doctor who had returned 
to the United States from Guinea, further emphasizing the importance of entry screening as an 
added measure and active monitoring by state health departments (Hartocollis & Santora, 2014). 
Since then, the CDC has published a revised version of its Monitoring and Movement Guidance, 
which is used as a recommendation for states in determining what type of monitoring to pursue 
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for travelers with different levels of risk for Ebola. As of now, any traveler from Guinea, Liberia, 
Mali, or Sierra Leone with no symptoms or exposures is considered to be in the low (but not 
zero) risk category, and is recommended to be actively monitored for 21 days. 
Discussion on Screening versus Travel Bans 
  On November 5, the Director for WHO’s Global Capacities, Alert and Response 
Division, released a commentary on travel bans, stating clearly that they are not going to solve 
this outbreak: 
Cutting off beleaguered West African nations would be catastrophic to families and 
economies. People in countries, far from the hot zone, may be lulled into a false sense of 
security, believing Ebola can never reach them if flights are halted. In reality, it is 
impossible to stop the movement of people motivated to see loved ones or seek a better 
life for their children. Every day there are millions of people crossing the planet, not only 
by airplane but traversing uncontrolled land borders in remote areas, or as crew on the 
thousands of ships trading goods up and down the world’s coastlines. The key to stopping 
the international spread of this disease is global vigilance… All countries need to have 
strong systems in place to identify people at risk at the earliest possible moment, and 
apply stringent prevention and control measures for any case detected (Nuttall, 2014). 
 The following day, the World Health Organization published its “Interim Guidance on 
Ebola Virus Disease Exit Screening at Airports, Ports and Land Crossings”, which used much of 
the content that CDC’s International Assistance Team had recommended, including the 
templates that CDC’s Data Management Unit had created to be used in exit screening procedures 
(World Health Organization, 2014).  
Since the inception of exit screening, researchers have found that screening travelers who 
are exiting countries with widespread Ebola transmission prevents 2 to 8 of these travelers at risk 
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for developing Ebola from traveling internationally (Bogoch et al., 2014). Even though data 
management’s future in assessing these exit screening procedures may be uncertain, the public 
can be confident that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the World Health 
Organization, and myriads of stakeholders on a global, national and local scale are all working 
together in the midst of a localized, yet massive outbreak, to prevent it from spreading widely in 
a borderless world. The Data Management Unit is continuing to look for avenues to provide 
recommendations and support as exit screening continues in these countries, until there is a 
definite end to this sustained epidemic.  
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Manually assigned or 
automatically generated? 




Available in which 
database(s)? 
Passport Number Manually assigned Any individual with intent 
of international travel 
undergoing screening 
Universal Only in exit screening 
database 
Form ID Manually assigned Any traveler referred to 
secondary screening at a 
point of entry/exit 
Database-specific Only in exit screening 
database 
UniqueKey Automatically generated Any individual with intent 
of international travel 
undergoing screening 
Database-specific Only in exit screening 
database 
Outbreak Case ID Manually assigned Any suspect, probable or 
confirmed VHF case 




Manually assigned Any suspect, probable or 
confirmed VHF case 
Database-specific Only in contact 
investigation database 
ID Automatically generated Any contact of a suspect, 
probable or confirmed 
VHF case 
Database-specific Only in contact 
investigation database 
Table 1 – Comparison of unique identifiers across two Epi Info databases.  
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